Is the 18th Party Congress stalling for change?
“Are we obsessing about (China’s) rise when we should be worried about
its fall?”, asks Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna
College and senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in
his article “Everything You Think You Know About China Is Wrong” dated 29
August 2012 in Foreign Policy. Click here
Professor Pei thinks that rather than worrying about how to contain a
stronger China, it would be at least equally sensible to think about China’s
possible collapse or self-inflicted regime change in the light of the country’s
recent economic slowdown, bursting property bubbles, power struggles and
political scandals.
This seems to echo the perennial theme of China’s doubters. Amongst them a leading light is Gordon Chang who has been serially predicting “China’s Coming Collapse” since 2001. His latest version here dated 29 December 2011 asks people to bet on the country’s collapse or beginning of a multi-decade decline from 2012.
Chang’s arguments are that China seems to turn xenophobic, pushing foreign investments away by insisting on “indigenous innovation”. China is heavily dependent on trade but there are now more exporting competitors amongst the emerging economies. China’s economy is contracting as her demographics are getting older. Moreover, the leadership is failing to respond to a rising tide of social change signified by increasing popular protests against official corruption and inequalities, the likes of which are sweeping across other parts of the world.
The problems highlighted are by no means exaggerated. Indeed, at the opening session of the latest 18th Party Congress, President Hu Jintao announced that reform, particularly fighting corruption, is a matter of life or death for the Party and the nation.
But China’s problems must be put in context. Consider the following –
(a) The latest OECD report here “Looking to 2060: Long-Term Global Growth Prospects” dated November 2012 suggests that “China will overtake the eurozone in 2012 and the US within the next four years to become the largest economy in the world. By 2060 …… the combined GDP of China (27.8%) and India (18.2%) will be larger than that of the OECD – and the total output of China, India and the rest of the developing world (57.7%) will be greater than that of developed OECD and non-OECD countries (42.3%)”.
(b) According to The Economist front cover article of 27 October 2012, notwithstanding rising levels of social discontent, “In the past ten years under the current leader, Hu Jintao, the economy has quadrupled in size in dollar terms. A new (though rudimentary) social safety net provides 95% of all Chinese with some kind of health coverage, up from just 15% in 2000. Across the world, China is seen as second in status and influence only to America”.
(c) Successive PEW public attitude surveys show that a vast majority of the population (exceeding 80%) remains broadly supportive of where the country is heading, in stark contrast to the surveys’ findings on many Western nations. Of course, the flip side of the coin is that 20% dissatisfied means a lot of people amongst China’s 1.3-billion-strong population. Nevertheless, there is no support for regime change and the rising cynicism and disgruntlement are against corruption and power abuse, albeit widespread, by individuals.
(d) Pei and Chang seem to disregard the fact that China’s leadership has long realized that the country has to reform and change to stay relevant with the times. Hence the dramatic change in direction in the current Five Year Plan (2011-15) towards slower and more balanced, more equitable and more sustainable growth.
(e) Notwithstanding competition and rivalry, which are common to all political systems, the different factions, power-centres, and vested interests of the Party polity all embrace and continue to benefit from China’s continuing reform and progress. The question is not whether to reform but where, how much, and how fast, and of course, how to apportion their respective power and influence.
(f) A large body of relatively moderate but yet significant reform measures have alaready been proposed in a 468-page World Bank report jointly undertaken with the Development Research Centre of the State Council (a rare occurrence). These include reforming the state-owned enterprises to allow more room for private enterprises, liberalizing the financial sector, defining the powers and obligations of local authorities to minimize the chances of improper “”land grabs”, changing the “hukou” system which marginalizes migrant workers, growing a green economy, and promoting the role of civil society. It is said that Li Keqiang, China’s likely Premier-in-waiting is the report’s staunch supporter. Click here
(g) It must be remembered that even Democracy is not a dirty word in China’s politics. In fact the D-word was mentioned 61 times by President Hu at the last Party Congress in 2007 and has been voiced many times since also by Premier Wen Jiabao. The difference is that China, including most of the population, remains unconvinced that copying the West’s increasingly dysfunctional model of confrontational multi-party politics is the best answer. China will therefore continue to find her own path towards effective, meritocratic, representative government of the people, for the people, though not directly by the people, at least not at this stage.
(h) Yes, China’s international environment is becoming more hostile. Notwithstanding China’s efforts in managing her “peaceful” rise or development, China’s neighbours are growing more restless with an 800-pound panda. But most of these worries translate into hedging their bets. There is no mileage towards an anti-China block as China remains their largest trading partner at the centre of a regional and global supply and production chain.
So, looking at the near-final list of contenders for China’s top leadership, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, why does it seem to be populated largely by “Old Brooms” (The Economist, 10-16 November, 2012) here who are not known for their reformist credentials?
The reasons are a little hidden beneath the surface –
In any case, regardless of the final choice for the Standing Committee at the 18th Party Congress, President Hu has emphasized that the Party’s objective is to achieve a Middle-Income Society by 2020, doubling the 2010 per capita income in the process. By that time, China is expected to achieve a per capita income of $10,000, up from $5,530 in 2011. Click here This is set to be followed during 2021-2015 by further jumps over the so-called Middle-Income Trap on the road to attain a higher-income society in the future. Click here
As the Standing Committee of the Politburo is tasked to carry out China’s collective decisions, including the current Five Year Plan (2011-15) and the goal of attaining a Middle Income Society by 2020, the new line-up of well-tried old timers does not mean that China is stalling for reform. In fact they are well-qualified for these tasks, which should concentrate their minds and keep their hands very full indeed during their tenure.
Best regards,
Andrew
www.andrewleunginternationalconsultants.com
This seems to echo the perennial theme of China’s doubters. Amongst them a leading light is Gordon Chang who has been serially predicting “China’s Coming Collapse” since 2001. His latest version here dated 29 December 2011 asks people to bet on the country’s collapse or beginning of a multi-decade decline from 2012.
Chang’s arguments are that China seems to turn xenophobic, pushing foreign investments away by insisting on “indigenous innovation”. China is heavily dependent on trade but there are now more exporting competitors amongst the emerging economies. China’s economy is contracting as her demographics are getting older. Moreover, the leadership is failing to respond to a rising tide of social change signified by increasing popular protests against official corruption and inequalities, the likes of which are sweeping across other parts of the world.
The problems highlighted are by no means exaggerated. Indeed, at the opening session of the latest 18th Party Congress, President Hu Jintao announced that reform, particularly fighting corruption, is a matter of life or death for the Party and the nation.
But China’s problems must be put in context. Consider the following –
(a) The latest OECD report here “Looking to 2060: Long-Term Global Growth Prospects” dated November 2012 suggests that “China will overtake the eurozone in 2012 and the US within the next four years to become the largest economy in the world. By 2060 …… the combined GDP of China (27.8%) and India (18.2%) will be larger than that of the OECD – and the total output of China, India and the rest of the developing world (57.7%) will be greater than that of developed OECD and non-OECD countries (42.3%)”.
(b) According to The Economist front cover article of 27 October 2012, notwithstanding rising levels of social discontent, “In the past ten years under the current leader, Hu Jintao, the economy has quadrupled in size in dollar terms. A new (though rudimentary) social safety net provides 95% of all Chinese with some kind of health coverage, up from just 15% in 2000. Across the world, China is seen as second in status and influence only to America”.
(c) Successive PEW public attitude surveys show that a vast majority of the population (exceeding 80%) remains broadly supportive of where the country is heading, in stark contrast to the surveys’ findings on many Western nations. Of course, the flip side of the coin is that 20% dissatisfied means a lot of people amongst China’s 1.3-billion-strong population. Nevertheless, there is no support for regime change and the rising cynicism and disgruntlement are against corruption and power abuse, albeit widespread, by individuals.
(d) Pei and Chang seem to disregard the fact that China’s leadership has long realized that the country has to reform and change to stay relevant with the times. Hence the dramatic change in direction in the current Five Year Plan (2011-15) towards slower and more balanced, more equitable and more sustainable growth.
(e) Notwithstanding competition and rivalry, which are common to all political systems, the different factions, power-centres, and vested interests of the Party polity all embrace and continue to benefit from China’s continuing reform and progress. The question is not whether to reform but where, how much, and how fast, and of course, how to apportion their respective power and influence.
(f) A large body of relatively moderate but yet significant reform measures have alaready been proposed in a 468-page World Bank report jointly undertaken with the Development Research Centre of the State Council (a rare occurrence). These include reforming the state-owned enterprises to allow more room for private enterprises, liberalizing the financial sector, defining the powers and obligations of local authorities to minimize the chances of improper “”land grabs”, changing the “hukou” system which marginalizes migrant workers, growing a green economy, and promoting the role of civil society. It is said that Li Keqiang, China’s likely Premier-in-waiting is the report’s staunch supporter. Click here
(g) It must be remembered that even Democracy is not a dirty word in China’s politics. In fact the D-word was mentioned 61 times by President Hu at the last Party Congress in 2007 and has been voiced many times since also by Premier Wen Jiabao. The difference is that China, including most of the population, remains unconvinced that copying the West’s increasingly dysfunctional model of confrontational multi-party politics is the best answer. China will therefore continue to find her own path towards effective, meritocratic, representative government of the people, for the people, though not directly by the people, at least not at this stage.
(h) Yes, China’s international environment is becoming more hostile. Notwithstanding China’s efforts in managing her “peaceful” rise or development, China’s neighbours are growing more restless with an 800-pound panda. But most of these worries translate into hedging their bets. There is no mileage towards an anti-China block as China remains their largest trading partner at the centre of a regional and global supply and production chain.
So, looking at the near-final list of contenders for China’s top leadership, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, why does it seem to be populated largely by “Old Brooms” (The Economist, 10-16 November, 2012) here who are not known for their reformist credentials?
The reasons are a little hidden beneath the surface –
- Quite near the eleven hour, the Bo Xilai affair unexpectedly derailed the leadership transition process, which was fiercely competitive in the first place. The political crisis and what it meant for the future stability of the Party required a re-think of the role and status of politically-powerful portfolios in the Standing Committee i.e. public security and propaganda. These were nearly high-jacked by politically-ambitious individuals like Bo and must not be allowed to happen again at the centre of China’s power. So a smaller Standing Committee of seven instead of nine members was mooted, throwing open an even more fractious battle amongst various factions, vested interests and power-brokers to get their preferred choices into the even narrower door.
- A number of very senior, well-tried and well-connected Politburo members are getting near the retiring age limit of over 67 for entry into the Standing Committee. This is their very last chance to make it. These include Yu Zhengsheng (67), Zhang Dejian (66), Zhang Gaoli (66), Liu Yunshan (65), and Wang Qishan (64). Their claims to a seat in the Standing Committee perhaps for just one term are difficult to brush aside, particularly when some are backed by influential power-brokers like ex-President Jiang Zemin. The younger and perhaps more dynamic hopefuls, e.g. Li Yuanchao (62) and Wang Yang (57) may have to bide their time for the shoes of retirees at the next 19th Party Congress in 2017, which is still expected to be under the leadership of Xi Jinping (59) as President and Li Keqiang (57) as Premier, if all goes well.
- Bearing in mind the need to root out any remnants of the “Bo Xilai gang”, stability of the Party remains paramount at this stage. So, while domestic and external pressures remain broadly manageable, the Party may have reached a compromise to allow more old guards in the Standing Committee just for one term before younger, more dynamic substitutes waiting in the wings take centre stage in the next term.
In any case, regardless of the final choice for the Standing Committee at the 18th Party Congress, President Hu has emphasized that the Party’s objective is to achieve a Middle-Income Society by 2020, doubling the 2010 per capita income in the process. By that time, China is expected to achieve a per capita income of $10,000, up from $5,530 in 2011. Click here This is set to be followed during 2021-2015 by further jumps over the so-called Middle-Income Trap on the road to attain a higher-income society in the future. Click here
As the Standing Committee of the Politburo is tasked to carry out China’s collective decisions, including the current Five Year Plan (2011-15) and the goal of attaining a Middle Income Society by 2020, the new line-up of well-tried old timers does not mean that China is stalling for reform. In fact they are well-qualified for these tasks, which should concentrate their minds and keep their hands very full indeed during their tenure.
Best regards,
Andrew
www.andrewleunginternationalconsultants.com
posted by Chinawatch at 4:53 am
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