"China and Germany: Why the emerging special relationship matters for Europe"

In a European Council for Foreign Relations report here dated May 2012, its authors - Hans Kundnani, its editorial director, and Jonas Parello-Plesner, a senior policy fellow - caution that -

• For the European Union, China displays a tendency to deal with Berlin rather than Brussels as China sees Germany as increasingly possessing real power in the European Union just as its economy is becoming more dependent on China.

• Both Germany and China share common interests as the world's leading exporters, savers, and holders of large trade surpluses. They also share a similar belief in monetary and fiscal discipline and a desire to improve global economic governance, which is a kind of "post-crisis alignment".

• In foreign policy, Germany sees eye to eye with China in an aversion to the use of force, while China in additon, hopes to leverage Europe through Germany to balance against U.S. global dominance particularly in the wake of America's Pivot to Asia.

The authors opine that "Germany's instincts remain European, but (German) officials are frustrated by the failure of their attempt to develop a common strategic European approach to China and do not feel they can wait any longer. Germany must not give up on Europe. But the rest of Europe also urgently needs to help Germany to be a good European by developing a real "strategic partnership" with China before it is too late. The EU should identify where Europe can help Germany in its relationship with China; empower the European External Action Service (EEAS) to co-ordinate a "top-down" approach to China policy; and explore new formats for dealing with China ". 

China's apparent preferance for Berlin is in part due to the realization of Brussels' difficulties in navigating through the interests of 27 Member States. What is more revealing, however, is the irony in proposing that the EEAS should be empowered to coordinate a "top-down" EU approach to foreign policy towards China. 

As a watered-down euphemism for a real EU diplomatic service, the very contrived creation of the EEAS speaks volumes for the refusal of Member States, particularly the more powerful ones amongst them including Germany, to give up state sovereignty in foreign policy to a "top-down" pan-EU approach. 

So while the EEAS may be tasked to coordinate or define a "top-down" common EU policy, the outcome may well fall victim to incoherence in reconciling the irreconcilable. 

The condundrum is clearly that a common EU foreign policy, as in the case of a common fiscal policy, cannot really happen without a formal political union of all the Members into a "United States of Europe"".